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Understanding Tax Corruption
in Transition Economies:
Evidence from Bulgaria
Konstantin V. Pashev 1
number of companies involved (after bribes 
for licenses and permits). It also finds that tax 
corruption is increasing despite the fact that 
companies are net losers from tax bribery 
(i.e., the average cost of tax corruption in all 
countries exceeds or equals benefits) (Gray et 
al., 2004).
The situation in individual countries is 
hard to capture, as well. Bulgaria is a case in 
point. According to the tax corruption ranking 
of the Global Competitiveness Report, Bulgar-
ia is among the world’s top performers, scor-
ing higher in 2002 than any other transition 
country in Europe except for Lithuania and 
Slovenia (Annex 1.2). In contrast, according 
to the World Bank ranking, in 2002 Bulgaria 
performed worse than any other European 
transition country. (Gray et al., 2004). Such 
discrepancies show that measuring tax cor-
ruption is not an easy task. 2 The difficulties 
largely reflect some conceptual ambiguities 
about the underlying drivers, central to which 
is the concept of the business cost of corrup-
tion. Actually, few attempts to measure corrup-
tion target tax corruption per se. Most avail-
able measures and estimates are obtained in 
the context of measuring overall corruption 
levels regardless of the type of corruption 
or the administration concerned. Measures 
of overall corruption, however, are largely 
guided by the concept that bribes are extra 
costs imposed on business. Consequently, the 
level of corruption is derived from percep-
tions and assessments of entrepreneurs and 
investment risk experts. Accordingly, one of 
the basic measures of corruption is the “bribe 
Abstract:
Measures of corruption are based on the con-
cept of bribes as extra business costs. Drawing 
evidence from corruption surveys of business 
and tax service in Bulgaria, this paper looks 
at the bribe as a price paid by the taxpayer in 
exchange for income-maximizing services sup-
plied by corrupt tax officials. It distinguishes 
between corruption for tax evasion and cor-
ruption related to excessive voluntary compli-
ance costs. The latter is closer to the concept 
of bribes as costs imposed on business, but 
is limited in scale relative to the former. It is 
in this framework that the study analyses the 
drivers of the demand and supply of corrup-
tion “services” and proposes an indicator 
framework for “sizing up” the problem, evalu-
ating the strength of the underlying factors 
and formulating anti-corruption policies 
whose effect can be monitored and evaluated 
using that framework.
Introduction
The difficulties of measuring economic 
phenomena which have value only as far 
as they remain hidden, such as tax corrup-
tion, are obvious. The measures rely largely 
on opinion surveys that reflect perceptions 
and assessments of taxpayers. They provide 
mixed evidence about transition countries. 
According to the Global Corruption Barometer 
of Transparency International (2004), in most 
new market economies, the tax administra-
tion is not among the five most corrupt insti-
tutions (Annex 1.1). Conversely, in a recent 
World Bank study on corruption in transition 
economies, tax corruption is ranked second 
among other types of corruption in terms of 
1 The author is a Senior Fellow in the Economic Program of 
the Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, Bulgaria. This 
paper was prepared during a Fulbright senior scholarship 
research exchange hosted by the Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA.
2 They may be attributed to differences in methodology, but 
the point is that they can hardly provide a reliable guide to 
policy makers. Perhaps the only benefit for policy makers 
would be that at the time they would be able to refer to 
the GCR scores when externally promoting Bulgaria as an 
attractive place for FDI, and to the World Bank scores when 
internally promoting the necessity of the Bank’s revenue 
administration reform loan.
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tax,” i.e., the direct 
financial cost of bribes 
to the company. 3
While there is no 
doubt that corruption 
implies considerable 
cost to the business 
sector, there are some 
important qualifica-
tions that may help 
better understand the 
behavior of bribers. 
Above all, it may help 
to distinguish the eco-
nomic costs of corrup-
tion in terms of unfair 
competition, market 
malfunction and misal-
location of resources 
from the direct busi-
ness cost of the bribe 
for the briber. The 
business cost concept 
has more validity with regard to corruption 
in the field of licenses and permits or public 
services, including services to tax payers. 
However, it is less clear why bribes paid by 
companies to evade taxes or import duties, to 
win public contracts or to influence court de-
cisions should be interpreted and measured 
through indicators such as the “bribe tax,” 
implying that these costs are imposed on the 
companies. 4 In the aforementioned corruption 
types, it is the income-maximizing choice for 
companies rather than pressure by the public 
administration that drives demand for these 
types of corruption services. In this sense, 
revenue corruption related to fraud, as well 
as corruption in the public arena or judiciary, 
needs to be distinguished conceptually from 
corruption related to public services such as 
licensing, tax services, healthcare, etc. 5
The importance of having more objective 
measures of tax corruption is straightforward. 
No doubt, this still remains a major chal-
lenge of transition. The TI Global Corruption 
Barometer’s average regional score of tax 
corruption is 3.4 (Annex 1.1). The Corruption 
Monitoring Indices of Coalition 2000 in Bul-
garia, for instance, show that more than half 
of the surveyed companies in the last four 
years think that all or most tax officials are 
involved in corruption. About 20 percent of 
the respondents have experienced corruption 
pressure by tax officials. On the other hand, a 
survey of Bulgarian tax officials 6 discovered 
that they admit that there is corruption among 
them, but on a fairly limited scale. According 
to these tax officials, the public’s perception 
of wide spread of corruption in tax administra-
tion are largely exaggerated (1) 7.
3 See, for instance, Gray et al., 2004 p. 21
4 The only plausible argument may go that they are imposed 
on the company by the business environment, i.e., a 
company’s choice to make a bribe for the aforementioned 
benefits is a response to corruption practiced by competitors. 
This argument may have some “ethical” value for companies 
as a justification of their involvement in bribery, but it has 
little practical value for policy-making. Primary drivers of 
tax corruption are more important for the latter than the 
secondary drivers attributed to a corrupt environment.
5 This, however, does not imply that corruption related to 
public services is always imposed by the supplier of these 
services. It may also be a result of an income-maximizing 
choice by companies. However, from the policy perspective, 
there is a substantial difference between whether a 
company makes a bribe to evade taxes or to avoid excessive 
compliance costs.
6 The survey was carried out in Bulgaria in March 2004 by 
Vitosha Research through face-to-face interviews with a 
sample of 699 tax officials from the local tax directorates 
in Bulgaria. Part of the findings are available at http: 
//www.vitosha-research.com/focus_bg.htm If not otherwise 
indicated, data and evidence referring to tax administration 
are derived from that survey.
7 The numbers in brackets in the text indicate the figure 
number referred to.
1. The Spread of Corruption in the Tax Administration
(% of responses)
* Members of the general public and of the business community responded regard-
ing the administration as a whole, while tax officials were asked about their respec-
tive departments. The general public and business community data were sourced 
from the relevant surveys of Vitosha Research, Coalition 2000 Corruption Monitoring, 
for April-May 2004.
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This poses important policy questions. 
Is the business community unjust to the tax 
administration? If so, this is not only, and not 
mainly, just a problem for tax authorities. Bad 
scores might deter investment regardless of 
the actual level of corruption. Furthermore, 
incorrect perceptions of corruption levels may 
materialize as companies choose whether or 
not to evade taxes and offer bribes according 
to their perceptions about what competitors 
are doing. In this context, it is not just the tax 
administration, but the economy and business 
that may be the victim of too much or incor-
rect assessment of corruption. How much 
does the public notion depart from the actual 
level? What are the economic costs of the 
departure, and what are the implications for 
formulating and monitoring policy?
This paper does not provide complete 
answers to the above questions. It rather tries 
to contribute to the understanding of the fac-
tors, on both the supply and demand sides, 
of tax corruption in transition economies. It 
proposes indicators that might help in “sizing 
up” the problem and in monitoring and evalu-
ating anticorruption policies. It draws from 
the vast body of theoretical and empirical 
research on the topic but departs from other 
studies in several important ways. First, it at-
taches primary importance to measuring the 
strength of the drivers of corruption in parallel 
with its level and intensity. This may be more 
useful in terms of policy formulation and 
monitoring. Consequently, it focuses on one 
type of corruption, as the underlying drivers 
vary across corruption types. Second, it looks 
at tax corruption as a result of transactions 
between two beneficiaries. This departs from 
the prevailing “business cost” concept. In this 
setting, the taxpayer receives some undue 
favor by the tax official in return for a bribe as 
the price for this corruption “service”. Third, 
it uses evidence from both business and the 
tax administration to identify the drivers on 
the demand and supply side and their relative 
weight in corruption. Fourth, it distinguishes 
between bribes for tax evasion and bribes 
for avoiding excessive compliance costs. 
Important in this regard is the distinction as 
well between economic and business costs of 
corruption. Even though business suffers from 
the economic costs of corruption, it is the im-
mediate business benefits that drive bribery. 
Finally, these are drivers on the demand side. 
This study argues that the most important 
factor for corruption deals are the drivers and 
deterrents on the supply side; therefore, the 
viewpoint of the tax officials is important.
The paper is organized in five sections. 
Section l locates the place of revenue corrup-
tion among the other corrupt practices for the 
purpose of putting together a definition that 
is helpful for evaluating its level and drivers. 
Section 2 and 3 use the transaction framework 
to study the drivers and deterrents on the 
demand and the supply side respectively. 
Section 4 derives tools and measures for diag-
nosing the level of corruption and its drivers. 
Section 5 is the conclusion.
1. Definition and typology
The most straightforward definition of corrup-
tion is abuse of power for private gains. Figure 
2 illustrates various types of corruption prac-
tices. This typology is far from complete. It is 
based on the type of power or professional 
responsibilities that are subject to abuse. The 
aim is to roughly locate corruption related to 
tax collection among corruption practices in 
general for the sole purpose of defining the 
object of measurement.
The conventional narrow definition of cor-
ruption boils down to abuse of public power. 
When the abuse of power takes place at the 
level of public administration, it is defined as 
administrative or bureaucratic corruption. It 
is largely a part of the so called “petty corrup-
tion” which encompasses corruption prac-
tices at the low public service levels. 8 Petty 
corruption also includes bribes related to the 
delivery of public services and out-of-court 
fines and enforcement of regulations (e.g., 
road police, etc.). This constitutes the most 
widely spread corruption in transition coun-
tries in terms of number of corruption “deals” 
and people involved on both sides. When the 
abuse is of legislative or executive power, it 
is defined as grand or political corruption. 
Furthermore, according to the type of power 
that is subject to abuse, corruption may take 
place in the judiciary and other institutions of 
law enforcement, as well as in relation to the 
8 In fraud related corruption, however, the term connotes a 
hierarchical level rather than the size of the bribes.
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delivery of various public services such as 
education, health, social benefits, etc.
In addition to the distinction according 
to the type of abused power, the typology 
of corruption can be extended according to 
the nature of the gains. Thus, a distinction 
can be made between the misuse of power 
by the agent at the expense of the principal 
for the agent’s direct benefit (e.g., direct 
embezzlement) and misuse of power for the 
benefit of a third party in return for a bribe. 
In the latter case, private gains include not 
only cash (bribes), but gains in kind as well 
(gifts, services, including “barter” corruption 
services, use of influence, etc.), which may 
benefit the person who provides the service, 
friends and relatives or even political parties. 
These non-bribe benefits imply that not all 
corruption practices are easy to capture and 
measure. Corruption for financing of politi-
cal parties is actually a leading concern in all 
transition countries (Annex 1.2). Furthermore, 
according to the level of government, politi-
cal and bureaucratic corruption may have 
central, regional or municipal dimensions. Of 
course, these divisions are far from absolute. 
Corruption related to privatization, conces-
sions, renting out state or municipal property 
or land can involve grand or petty corruption 
at the local or central level according to the 
object of the deal –this can range from parking 
lots in the city center to extraction of national 
resources to the use of radio and telecom-
munication frequencies. The common feature 
of all these deals is that they involve the sale 
or renting out of limited public resources at 
prices lower than the market price, or supplies 
from the private sector at prices higher than 
those on the market. Applying non-market 
prices in the transactions between the public 
and the private sector implies that public man-
agers may have the power to perform their 
functions in someone’s private interest against 
benefits.
Corruption, however, is neither an exclu-
sive territory of the public sector, nor of the 
developing and transition countries. In the 
recent years, time and again the world has 
been witness to grand scandals in the corpo-
rate world, sports, media, NGOs, including 
trade unions, and international organizations. 
These scandals constitute a serious chal-
lenge to the basic caveat of public economics 
and regulatory economics, namely that the 
level of corruption is largely determined by 
the size of the government; i.e., no efforts in 
2. Tax corruption in the tree of corruption practices
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curbing corruption can yield lasting results if 
the of weight government in the economy is 
not reduced. 9 While this is true with regard 
to the misuse of public power, it is hardly 
true for the overall level of corruption, and 
this includes the private sector. The latter is 
important not only because of spillover effects 
on bureaucratic and political corruption but 
because it may incur larger costs to investors 
compared to public sector corruption. 10
Administrative corruption, to which cor-
ruption related to revenue collection belongs, 
can be divided into three broad categories: 
corruption in revenue administration, corrup-
tion related to public expenditure manage-
ment, and corruption related to administrative 
regulation and control. The first category 
contains three subcategories according to the 
agency where it takes place: corruption in tax 
administration, corruption at the customs of-
fice and corruption in the collection of social 
insurance contributions.
In this context, tax corruption is defined 
here as misuse of administrative power 
related to the enforcement of tax regulations 
(i.e., taxpayer services, tax collection, inspec-
tions and audits) for private gains. This allows 
one to distinguish tax corruption from politi-
cal corruption related to taxes. The aim of the 
latter is to influence the establishment of the 
rules of the game, rather than their enforce-
ment (see section 2.3). Second, this definition 
distinguishes it from corruption practices in 
the tax administration that relate to public ex-
penditure management: corruption in public 
procurement, nepotism, direct embezzlement, 
etc. Even though these two groups are not 
directly related to enforcement of tax regula-
tions, the scale and consequences in a transi-
tion economy should not be underestimated. 
They may exceed conventional tax corruption 
in the value of benefits and bribes and in 
resultant institutional and market distortions. 
More importantly, they generate it at all levels 
of revenue administration and law enforce-
ment. 11
Bribery related to tax collection is the 
result of a deal between two beneficiaries, 
with the bribe or the benefit being the price 
for the service supplied by the administration. 
Our survey of tax administration in Bulgaria 
found that the initiative for this deal most 
often comes from the taxpayer (3). One in four 
tax officials reports direct pressure from brib-
ers and one third have experienced indirect 
offers. Therefore, this analysis starts with 
demand-side factors.
3. Sources of corruption pressure
Which party initiates the bribe? (%)
Taxpayers 52.1
Tax offi cers 1.9
Both parties equally 23.9
Other 0.9
DK/NA 21.3
How often during the last year have you been 
offered a bribe? (% of responses) 
Directly Indirectly
In all or most occasions 1.0 2.9
Rarely 24.2 31.0
Never 67.1 58.1
I had no such contact 5.4 5.6
Don’t know/No answer 2.3 2.4
2. Demand side drivers and 
deterrents
Tax corruption can be defined in terms of 
the services which are subject to bribery 
9 There is some preliminary evidence that with the withdrawal 
of the state from college education in Bulgaria, corruption 
there increased (see Coalition 2000 Corruption indices at 
www.anticorruption.bg; ).
10 The border between bribery and marketing promotion in 
private business practice is often elusive. For instance, if an 
air carrier gives away free tickets to frequent flyers, this falls 
under the definition of marketing. If it gives a free ticket to 
the person in charge of purchasing air tickets for a private 
company, it falls in the twilight zone between marketing 
and bribing a corporate client employee, but if this person 
works for a state agency, then it falls under the definition of 
bribery. In all three cases, it may be entered in the books 
as a marketing expense. From a marketing standpoint, the 
companies are not expected to differentiate between private 
and public sector clients in fighting for a larger market share: 
what is good for the corporate client should be good for the 
public sector client as well. On the other hand, in the context 
of investment risk and cost assessment, a corrupt public 
official is not necessarily a higher risk and cost than corrupt 
managers, employees, clients, trade unions, or business 
organizations. The quality of the private sector management, 
operations and associations may be a larger source of 
uncertainty and risk than the quality of the public sector in 
investment decisions.
11 The reason for leaving them out of the scope of this paper 
is that they require other policy interventions that may fall 
outside the domain of the tax administration (as in the case 
of political corruption) or tax regulations and enforcement 
(as in the case of expenditure-related corruption), and 
require a different dataset and methodology which are not 
agency-specific.
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agreements between taxpayers and the ad-
ministration. Taxpayers make bribes for two 
groups of corruption services: those related 
to non-compliance and those related to pref-
erential services (speeding up procedures, 
tax refunds, etc). According to the Bulgarian 
tax officials surveyed, taxpayers make bribes 
mostly to conceal non-compliance and evade 
penalties 12: 65.5 percent of the respondents 
identify this as the major cause of bribery. Bet-
ter services remain a leading cause for bribes 
according to 23 percent of the respondents 
(Figures 4 and 5).
These two categories are related to the 
enforcement of the established rules of the 
game. As already mentioned, some business 
groups may make bribes or provide other 
favors to change the rules of the game. This is 
usually defined as political or legislative cor-
ruption even though the administration has a 
role to play in it as well. These three types are 
examined in more detail below.
2.1. Corruption related to evasion
The first category is related to the enforce-
ment functions of control and auditing. This, 
however, has as a prerequisite a taxpayer’s 
choice to evade taxes which is determined by 
the taxpayer’s estimate of expected benefits 
and costs. The benefits grow with the tax rate 
while the expected costs grow with the penal-
ty rate and the probability of detection. Thus, 
the net benefits are changed significantly by 
the chances of the tax evader to work out a 
deal with the tax inspector in case the evasion 
is detected.
After an initial excessive reliance on strin-
gent controls in transition countries 13 recently, 
there have been excessive expectations that 
tax cuts can reduce evasion. Theoretical 
models and empirical tests, however, provide 
mixed evidence on the relation between tax 
rates and evasion levels. The classical model 
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) assumes that 
12 It is important, however, to distinguish between non-compliance driven by an income-maximizing choice of the taxpayer (tax 
evasion), and non-compliance driven by unclear and excessive regulations, or discretionary enforcement of the law which is 
done in the next two sections.
13 See Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2000) for a comprehensive assessment of tax reforms in transition economies.
4. Purpose of bribes (% of responses)
5. What are the five most common “services”
provided for taxpayers who make bribes? (% of responses) 
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taxpayers are risk-averse. Consequently, the 
propensity to evade taxes is positively related 
to income. The richer the taxpayer, the more 
likely they are to take the risk of being caught, 
as the relative weight of the penalty as a per-
centage of their income or wealth is smaller. 
And, vice versa, the relative cost of the pen-
alty for the low-income evaders is higher. This 
leads to two opposite effects of the higher tax 
rate. On the one hand, the higher the rate, the 
higher the return on each unit of concealed 
income (which is known as the substitution 
effect). On the other hand, the higher the rate, 
the lower the taxpayer’s after-tax income, and 
the weaker their motivation to take the risk of 
evasion (the so-called income effect). Yitzhaki 
(1974), however, notes that if the penalty is 
based on the evaded tax rather than on the 
concealed income, then the net benefit, (i.e., 
the tax evaded minus the penalty) does not 
change with the tax rate. There is only income 
effect; i.e., contrary to common intuition, 
evasion should go down with the increase in 
tax rates. Conversely, if the taxpayer is risk-
neutral, there would only be the substitution 
effect. Despite the numerous extensions of 
the initial models of tax evasion and extensive 
empirical tests 14, the question of the relation 
between the rate and the level of evasion 
is not yet successfully resolved. The policy 
implications are that the effect of reduced tax 
rates on taxpayer propensity to evade taxes 
is ambiguous, depending on attitudes to risk 
and the penalty structure. The implications 
for a tax administration, however, are much 
more straightforward. According to Becker’s 
(1968) classic theory of crime prevention, tax 
evasion can be successfully deterred either 
through optimizing the penalty structure, or 
through raising the probability of detection. 
The latter is more expensive, especially if 
the probability of detection is mainly raised 
through increasing the frequency and cover-
age of control, rather than introducing more 
efficient risk management techniques. Exces-
sive reliance on penalty structure is not likely 
to yield results either. Penalties need to be 
enforceable.
Moreover, the opportunity to avoid 
penalty through a bribery deal with the tax 
inspector changes substantially the evader’s 
estimates of the risks and costs of detection. 
On the one hand, the opportunity of a bribery 
agreement reduces the cost, as normally the 
bribe is lower than the penalty; otherwise, 
there is no incentive for the briber to make 
the bribe. On the other hand, the opportunity 
of a bribe increases the probability of detec-
tion as a corrupt inspector would benefit from 
the bribe only if s/he detects and proves the 
evasion.
There has been speculation in the litera-
ture that an increase in penalties can lead to 
increase in the bribes. The only supplier of 
this kind of service is the tax auditor. S/he 
competes only with the law: as long as the 
bribe is lower than the fine, the evader has the 
incentive to pay it. 15 In the context of the cost 
of evasion, the increase of the bribe will in-
crease the motivation of the corrupt inspector 
to detect the crime, and thus the cost for the 
taxpayer (probability of detection times the 
bribe due). This may crowd out evasion and 
corruption towards the higher income levels, 
as increased costs would require larger-scale 
evasion to balance it. In balance, average 
evasion and bribe levels may increase, but 
this will further raise the probability of detec-
tion, while at the same time low-scale evasion 
and corruption will be reduced. 16 Such a 
scenario, however, hinges on the assumption 
that corrupt inspectors will take advantage 
of the increased penalties and increase the 
bribes. In practice, bribes often seem to be 
too low relative to the benefit for the briber. 
This implies that auditors’ perceptions of the 
cost of detection of the bribery (probability 
times penalty) must be very low. I will return 
to these supply side drivers in section three. 
Here we are looking at the size of the bribe as 
a component of taxpayer costs. In this sense, 
to interpret the bribe as costs imposed on 
business is equivalent to interpreting the pen-
alties for tax evasion in the same way.
Finally, the cost of evasion through brib-
ery depends as well on the probability that 
the briber will be punished not only for the 
14 For a review of the literature, see Sandmo (2004), Cowell 
(2004), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
15 There have also been opposing propositions that competition 
among bureaucrats may reduce bribes (see Gray et al., 2004: 
16), but these have not been substantiated.
16 This conclusion has important implications for measuring 
corruption levels, as often they are derived from the average 
size of bribes, a subject to which I will return later.
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evasion, but also for the bribery, and on the 
size of the penalty.
The bottom-line is that fighting corruption 
in tax administration means, above all, fighting 
tax evasion. The major demand-side determi-
nants of corruption as well as its major eco-
nomic consequences are related to tax evasion. 
In this context, the major indicators for the 
strength of the drivers of corruption related to 
evasion include the perceptions of the taxpay-
ers about the tax rates, the penalty structure for 
evasion, the probability of detection, the prob-
ability of working out a deal with the inspector, 
the size of the bribes, the rate of institutionaliza-
tion of corruption, the probability that the brib-
er will be punished and the size of this penalty. 
All of these are important determinants of the 
demand for tax corruption services related to 
evasion and are indispensable in evaluating the 
institutional setting in terms of corruption risk.
The Bulgarian tax administration survey 
provides some insight into this theoreti-
cal framework. It found that the list of most 
demanded corruption services is headed by 
VAT frauds. The overwhelming majority – 81 
percent of all tax officials and 92 percent of 
the auditors – identify VAT as the most critical 
area of tax fraud (6). Evasion of income taxes 
is low, and so is its relative weight on the de-
mand-side drivers of tax corruption. Accord-
ingly, tax officials identify VAT companies and 
large taxpayers as more likely to violate tax 
regulations than small taxpayers.
2.2 Corruption driven
by compliance costs
Apart from the direct costs of taxation, taxpay-
ers incur the cost of complying with the tax 
regulations. 17 While the type of corruption 
in tax administration, examined in the previ-
All TRSa Audits Inspections Collection Accounting Appeals Other
VAT 81.1 75.3% 92.2% 85.1% 81.5% 65.9% 100% 61.8%
CIT 3.0 4.2% 1.3% 0.0% 3.7% 4.5% 0% 8.8%
PIT 1.6 2.8% 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% 2.9%
Excise 3.1 3.8% 0.9% 7.5% 3.7% 2.3% 0% 5.9%
Property 0.9 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% 0.0% 0% 0.0%
DK/NA 10.3 12.2% 4.7% 7.5% 7.4% 27.3% 0% 20.6%
Base 699 288 232 67 27 44 7 34
6. Which tax is most often
subject to evasion? (%, single choice)
aTRS: Taxpayers registration and services
7. The Top Three Corruption – Related Tax Offences (% of respondents)
17 For a definition of compliance and administrative costs, see Sanford et al., (1989: Ch 1, pp3-23).
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ous paragraph, reflects a taxpayer’s choice to 
evade taxes, this one is driven by excessive 
compliance costs. Administrative deficiencies 
and legislative inconsistencies make these 
costs a strong driver of corruption in transi-
tion countries. On the one hand, they increase 
the time and money spent by taxpayers for 
understanding and fulfilling their obligations. 
On the other hand, inequitable law enforce-
ment places them at a disadvantage relative to 
non-compliant competitors. If entrepreneurs 
choose not to accept these costs, they may 
consider either disregarding the regulations, 
relying in the worst case scenario on making 
a bribe instead of paying a penalty or making 
a bribe in order to have procedures speeded 
up. A taxpayer’s net benefit from bribery is 
measured by the amount of time and money 
saved by ignoring or speeding up procedures 
minus the bribe. Net benefits may be larger 
than the benefits of tax evasion especially in 
the case of VAT refunds. Timely refunds are 
more important for the liquidity of many com-
panies than savings from evaded taxes.
There are usually two groups of institu-
tional factors that generate demand for this 
type of corruption services. The first is related 
to the long tax code terms for the various ad-
ministrative procedures and services. Stand-
ards of services and e-services are also rare 
or underdeveloped in transition countries. 
The second stems from flaws and imperfec-
tions in tax and accounting regulations which 
allow a large degree of administrative discre-
tion in the enforcement of the law.
Both bribes to avoid penalties for non-
fraudulent violation of tax regulations, and 
bribes for better services, are driven by exces-
sive compliance costs. However, they differ 
substantially. Similar to corruption related 
to tax evasion, bribes for avoiding penalties 
imply a taxpayer’s rational choice to ignore 
regulations. The tax official can only take 
advantage of the detected violation. In the 
framework of supply and demand of corrup-
tion services, this is corruption related to 
non-compliance and is largely demand driven. 
In contrast, corruption for better and faster 
services involves compliant taxpayers and is 
largely a supply-side phenomenon. Delays in 
procedures may be caused by corrupt officials 
aiming at a bribe or because they are busy 
working for those who have already made 
bribes. Thus, they are in a position to create 
a demand for this type of service. Nominally 
the taxpayer pays for the benefit of unfair 
advantages over competitors. But in a highly 
corrupt environment, taxpayers may need to 
make bribes to “keep their turn in line” rather 
than to “jump ahead.”
The Bulgarian tax administration survey 
indicates that the relative weight of these two 
types of corruption is considerable. Avoiding 
fines and penalties is ranked at the top of the 
8. Contacts with Taxpayers Assessed 
 (“How often during the past one year have you encountered the following taxpayer behavior?”)
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list of corruption services identified by tax 
employees. (see Figure 5 above). These are 
non-fraudulent violations. VAT frauds and tax 
evasion are ranked separately. Faster services 
and tax refunds are ranked second and third 
on this list. As already shown in Figure 4, 23 
percent of officials surveyed indicated that the 
leading motive for taxpayers to offer bribes is 
to get better services. A tax official’s assess-
ment of his/her relation to clients indicates 
that there is a lot of space for these types of 
corruption services. Interaction between the 
two parties seems uneasy with a large gap in 
the understanding of each party’s rights and 
obligations (8).
2.3 Corruption for regulatory tax 
privileges and benefits
As already mentioned, except for adminis-
trative corruption related to enforcement of 
regulations, the biggest issue of corruption 
is related to changing the rules of the game. 
As the objective of the latter is to influence 
policy making and legislation, it is usually 
distinguished from administrative corruption 
and referred to as political corruption. But can 
the rules be written without the participation 
of those who are responsible for enforcement? 
Legislators and finance ministers are responsi-
ble for policy and law making, but the revenue 
administration also has an important role to 
play in setting the rules of the game. Normally, 
the tax administration participates in the draft-
ing stage, 18 and more importantly, it creates 
the secondary implementation legislation. 
Moreover, regulatory flaws and inconsisten-
cies often require decisions by the central tax 
directorates whose job it is to interpret regu-
lations. Therefore, corruption for regulatory 
benefits is not only in the sphere of politics 
and legislation. In this context, the distinc-
tion between state capture and administrative 
corruption 19 has grounds only in the sense 
that usually granting regulatory preferences 
to a business group or lobby requires political 
support. But even in this case, policy mak-
ers need the support of the administration’s 
experts and executives to put their ideas into 
practice. The latter may not share directly 
in the benefits granted by business to their 
superiors, but surely their loyalty would not 
go unrewarded.
Moreover, as central administration cre-
ates secondary and tertiary legislation (ordi-
nances, instructions, circular letters on the 
enforcement of the regulations), in transition 
countries where political and citizen control 
on administration may be weaker, high-rank-
ing officials may play active role in changing 
the rules of the game to serve vested busi-
ness interests independently of the political 
elite. Unlike the case where the administra-
tion changes the rules of the game to meet 
demands of the overseeing political establish-
ment, in the second case it does this to meet a 
direct business demand. 20
Summing up the analysis of the demand-
side drivers of tax corruption, taxpayer ben-
efit is the leading driver of bribery related to 
evasion. Bad regulations and administrative 
deficiencies also create a substantial part of 
the demand for corruption services, which 
either seek to avoid penalties for non-compli-
ance (other than fraud), or to speed up pro-
cedures and services. In the latter, business 
has less choice than in the case of the corrup-
tion, related to evasion, while, conversely, the 
administration is in a position to navigate the 
interaction with the client towards bribery out-
come. As corruption is mainly related to tax 
delinquency, it is reasonable to accept the pre-
vailing opinion of the tax officials that the ini-
tiative for most corruption deals comes from 
business. It is noteworthy, however, that again, 
according to the overall assessment of Bulgar-
ian tax officials, pressure from the clients is 
not among the leading causes of tax corrup-
tion. In their ranking of the leading bribery 
18 One of the flaws in the tax reforms of transition was that 
significant changes in tax legislation were passed without 
consultation with the tax administration about enforcement 
feasibility or allowing them time to prepare taxpayers for the 
change. (Martinez and McNab, 2000).
19 See, for instance, World Bank (2000) and Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufman (2000). These studies introduced the term “state 
capture” to denote bribes for changing the rules of the game. 
As “political clientelism,” it denotes patronage by the state of 
vested business interests, the political clientele.
20 This type of corruption, when the administration changes 
the rules in a direct deal with business, is not well studied in 
transition economies. Institutional and oversight deficiencies 
in many countries, however, suggest that it may take place. 
Owners of some patent micro-businesses in Bulgaria, such 
as taxi drivers, video rental shops and real estate agents 
attribute upward adjustments of the patent tax mainly to 
payments by monopoly or oligopoly lobbies aiming to crowd 
them out of the market or to buy them. The initiative for 
these adjustments, however, rarely comes from legislators.
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drivers, the pressure from taxpayers is ranked 
7th (Figure 9). Other drivers, which determine 
the supply of bribery services, come higher 
among the major causes of corruption.
3. Supply-side drivers, restraints 
and opportunities
If we temporarily ignore ethical tax brakes, 
the choice of a tax official to take a bribe is 
determined by his assessment of the expected 
benefits and costs. The benefits are usually de-
fined as an increase in his utility. Other things 
being equal, the lower the tax official’s income 
and the higher the bribe, the bigger the in-
crease in his utility will be and the larger the 
incentive to engage in corruption. The costs, 
in terms of Becker’s (1968) classical theory 
of crime prevention, are determined by the 
bribee’s assessment of the probability of detec-
tion of the bribery and the cost of the punish-
ment. The lower the probability of detection 
Tax offi cers’ low salaries 52.2
The ethics of the tax offi cials 35.2
Legislation allowing discretionary enforcement 30.9
Mixing administrative duties and personal interests 21.5
The pursuit of a quick increase in income 19.3
Widespread corruption in society 17.7
Pressure from taxpayers and insuffi cient protection and safety of tax offi cials 17.6
Complex and lengthy bureaucratic procedures 16.9
Demoralizing impact of grand corruption 10.3
Old facilities and equipment and poor work conditions 10.2
Frequent changes in legislation 9.2
Insuffi cient number of tax offi cials 6.3
Ineffi cient internal control and sanctions mechanisms 4.9
High taxes, fees and fi nes 3.1
Flaws in enforcement and work processes 2.9
Pressure from colleagues and superiors 1.9
Ineffi cient service provision (slow procedures) 1.7
Ineffi cient risk management and selection of audits 1.4
Other (please specify) 0.9
Don’t know/No answer 3.7
9. a) What are the major drivers of corruption in tax administration?
(%, up to three responses)
Problems Total TRSa Audits Inspections Collect. Account. Appeals Other NA
Low remuneration 75.5% 72.2% 77.2% 89.6% 77.8% 68.2% 42.9% 70.8% 100.0%
Old facilities & equipment 61.4% 60.1% 69.0% 56.7% 70.4% 45.5% 71.4% 29.2% 70.0%
Red tape and slow procedures 58.7% 53.8% 65.5% 58.2% 66.7% 54.5% 42.9% 45.8% 80.0%
Frequent changes in tax regulations 58.1% 51.4% 69.4% 52.2% 66.7% 40.9% 57.1% 58.3% 80.0%
Loopholes in legislation 52.5% 39.9% 67.2% 59.7% 59.3% 38.6% 57.1% 58.3% 50.0%
Low level of taxpayer culture and 
awareness of obligations 51.9% 60.1% 45.7% 46.3% 51.9% 45.5% 42.9% 41.7% 60.0%
Refusal by taxpayers to cooperate 40.5% 35.8% 43.5% 58.2% 40.7% 38.6% 28.6% 25.0% 40.0%
Ineffective enforcement (detection 
and sanctions against frauds) 35.6% 31.9% 40.1% 37.3% 48.1% 29.5% 14.3% 33.3% 40.0%
Frequent staff replacement 27.8% 29.2% 27.6% 28.4% 29.6% 18.2% 28.6% 25.0% 30.0%
Ineffective HR management 26.9% 23.6% 29.7% 23.9% 29.6% 27.3% 28.6% 29.2% 60.0%
High tax rates 26.2% 26.7% 23.7% 28.4% 33.3% 25.0% 14.3% 25.0% 50.0%
Corruption pressure by taxpayers 22.0% 23.6% 19.0% 23.9% 29.6% 25.0% 28.6% 8.3% 30.0%
Abuse by tax offi cials of their 
administrative power 20.9% 20.5% 20.3% 22.4% 33.3% 18.2% 14.3% 20.8% 20.0%
Shortage of professionals 16.9% 13.5% 21.6% 14.9% 14.8% 15.9% 42.9% 8.3% 30.0%
Ineffective voluntary compliance 
management 16.6% 16.0% 16.8% 19.4% 18.5% 13.6%  25.0% 10.0%
Lack of professional ethics and 
integrity among tax offi cials 12.4% 10.8% 11.2% 16.4% 25.9% 18.2%  8.3% 20.0%
Poor services provided to taxpayers 11.2% 11.1% 11.2% 13.4% 11.1% 11.4% 14.3% 4.2% 10.0%
Base 699 288 232 67 27 44 7 24 10
9. b) Problems faced by the tax administration
(% of employees who defined the problems as serious, i.e., highest on a 3-grade scale). 
aTRS: Taxpayers registration and services
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and the cost of the penalty, the more inclined 
the tax official would be to take a bribe. 21
Furthermore, as already mentioned, the tax 
official is not necessarily a passive taker of the 
bribe. In the case of strong incentives and weak 
brakes he may go beyond the normal call of duty 
to detect a fraud, take advantage of ambiguities 
in regulations, threaten with high fines or take 
too long to provide a service or process an ap-
plication. Moreover, the tax official has a much 
stronger position in the price setting process. 
As already noted, the taxpayer cannot get the 
“bribery” service from anyone else. His choice 
is basically between the cost of the bribe and 
the cost of the penalty or the cost of the delay. 
This puts him in a position of a price taker. It is 
the supplier who is more in a position of a price 
setter. The value of the bribe is likely to be set 
by the tax official in the range starting from the 
assessment of his costs up to the cost of statu-
tory penalty. His price-setting power is especially 
high when the legislation leaves the fixing of the 
fine largely in the hands of the administration. 22
The Bulgarian tax administration survey 
provides a useful illustration of supply-side 
drivers and deterrents. Tax officers identify 
the following as the major causes for corrup-
tion in tax administration: low wages, bad eth-
ics, mixing personal benefits and administra-
tive responsibilities, greed for a quick increase 
in income and flaws in regulations (8). Thus, 
the survey defines tax corruption as a result, 
above all, of low remuneration, low ethical 
standards and high compliance costs. External 
factors such as widespread corruption in soci-
ety and the demoralizing impact of corruption 
at the higher levels of power are also impor-
tant. Surprisingly, however, tax officials attach 
relatively low weight to elements of organiza-
tional efficiency pertaining to deterrents such 
as staff and expertise shortages, inefficiencies 
in the control and penalty systems, flaws in 
audits or enforcement, etc.
Accordingly, the countermeasures identi-
fied by tax officials are mainly an increase in 
remuneration for tax officials, reducing op-
portunities for administrative discretion in law 
enforcement and e-services (10).
3.1. Incentives
Perhaps not surprisingly, Bulgarian tax of-
ficials identify low wages as the prime reason 
for corruption. Low wages constitute the 
number one problem in all functional units, 
but “Inspections,” “Collection” and “Audits” 
seem to be most sensitive to it. (9b) Accord-
ingly, there is an absolute consensus (96 
percent of the respondents) on the primary 
importance of increased remuneration for 
curbing corruption. (10)
Yes No Already done DK/NA
Increasing tax administration remuneration 95.6 0.7 1.6 2.1
Clear legislation with reduced opportunities for administrative discretion 90.7 3.0 3.4 2.9
Optimizing the information to taxpayers on changes of legislation 81.0 4.6 12.4 2.0
E-services for taxpayers 78.5 4.6 11.9 5.0
Incentives for tax offi cials to report corruption pressure on them 69.7 11.4 13.7 5.2
Effi cient professional training system 68.5 8.4 19.9 3.1
Access of tax offi cials to a unifi ed tax register 63.8 8.2 18.6 9.4
Simplifying appeal procedures 59.8 12.7 15.2 12.3
Higher standards of reporting, control and sanctions 48.4 10.7 34.8 6.2
Rotation of auditors and inspectors 47.1 18.2 24.2 10.6
Optimizing work processes 44.2 5.2 47.4 3.3
Higher recruitment standards 43.9 13.0 37.9 5.2
Code of ethics 26.8 10.2 59.5 3.6
Other (please specify) 0.9 16.9 0.6 81.7
10. Which of the following countermeasures can reduce corruption? (% of responses)
21 Of course, an effective penalty depends on proving the 
bribery act; therefore, detection implies proof. One can 
speculate, however, that even if an investigation of a bribery 
act ends without proof and punishment, it still entails a cost 
for the bribee in terms of loss of reputation and image and 
is a deterrent in terms of the investigated official’s future 
involvement in corruption.
22 Bulgaria is a case in point. Concerning tax evasion, Bulgarian 
legislation does not regulate the penalty as a proportion of 
concealed income or evaded tax, but sets the ceilings for 
fines at BGL 1000 (EUR1= BGL 1.956) for income taxes and 
BGL10000 (EUR5000) in the case of VAT frauds. This structure 
leaves much room for discretionary setting of fines, and 
thus, for corruption pressure. On the other hand, it may be 
argued that in terms of the cost of evasion, the bribe should 
have the same deterrent power as the fine, i.e., the higher 
the expected bribe, the lower the motives of the taxpayer to 
evade taxes.
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The negative relationship between wages 
and administrative corruption has been well 
established in the literature. Nevertheless, the 
capacity of wage adjustments for minimizing 
corruption is not straightforward. As Figure 
9 shows, Bulgarian tax officials identify low 
wages and low ethical standards as the lead-
ing motives for corruption. In the words of 
Tanzi (1998), corruption is partly due to need 
and partly due to greed. Figure 11 illustrates 
the negative relationship between corrup-
tion and the level of remuneration. The curve 
CC indicates that the higher the wage level, 
the lower the corruption levels. High wages, 
however, do not eliminate corruption, as 
not all corruption is due only to need. Thus, 
corruption levels may indeed be reduced to 
point A through increasing the wage level to 
R. Between point A and O, progress in limiting 
corruption slows down as corruption due to 
greed prevails. Thus, even though the level of 
corruption is negatively related to the level of 
remuneration, above a certain level of wages, 
they are not effective tools for reducing cor-
ruption. Such a relationship is well document-
ed by empirical tests as well. 23
The policy implications of this conjunc-
ture are that, depending on the starting level 
of remuneration, the costs of wage adjust-
ment may substantially exceed the benefits 
of reducing corruption. Targeting the optimal 
level of wages, where the marginal costs of 
wage adjustment equals the marginal benefit of 
reduction in corruption, is a tough task. Trying 
to evaluate the cost and feasibility of minimiz-
ing corruption through wage adjustments, we 
used the tax administration survey in Bulgaria 
to obtain employee estimates of the wage 
levels that would minimize their vulnerability 
to bribery pressures. The responses (Table 
12) indicate that there is a large divergence in 
Min pay level 
(BGL)
What is the remuneration level* (including bonuses) that would reduce the drivers of 
corruption to a minimum? Total
300 400 450 500 550 650 800 1 000 DK/NA
Respondents % 3.6% 5.7% 3.4% 14.0% 7.2% 12.4% 16.7% 25.8% 11.2% 100.0%
Per capita 
household income           
<149 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 0.9%
150-199 8.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 2.0% 1.1% 3.4% 2.2% 0.0% 2.0%
200-299 12.0% 15.0% 25.0% 10.2% 10.0% 6.9% 6.8% 6.1% 11.5% 9.2%
300-399 20.0% 27.5% 12.5% 18.4% 22.0% 20.7% 15.4% 14.4% 11.5% 17.0%
400-499 28.0% 17.5% 33.3% 21.4% 16.0% 24.1% 16.2% 11.7% 12.8% 17.5%
500-599 12.0% 15.0% 16.7% 20.4% 18.0% 10.3% 15.4% 11.1% 16.7% 14.6%
600-699 12.0% 15.0% 4.2% 9.2% 14.0% 13.8% 13.7% 15.0% 9.0% 12.6%
700-799 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 10.0% 5.7% 10.3% 12.8% 7.7% 8.3%
800-899 4.0% 5.0% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 5.7% 4.3% 10.0% 3.8% 5.2%
900-999 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 4.1% 2.0% 4.6% 5.1% 5.6% 9.0% 4.7%
>1 000 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 1.0% 2.0% 4.6% 4.3% 6.7% 6.4% 4.1%
NA 0.0% 0.0% 8.3% 5.1% 2.0% 1.1% 4.3% 3.3% 10.3% 4.0%
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
12. The Gap Between Perceived
Anti-corruption Minimum Pay Levels and Actual Income Levels
*Monthly wages in BGL. The lev is fixed to the euro in the rate EUR1 = BGL 1.956. For reference, the statutory minimum 
wage in 2004 is BGL120. The highlighted percentages show what share of those that indicated the respective anti-corrup-
tion minimum actually enjoys this level of income.
23 See Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1997); Haque and Sahay (1996)
11. Corruption and wages
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employee perceptions about the anticorruption 
wage levels. Second, it shows a sizeable gap 
between their current household incomes and 
the self-assessed corruption-proof wage level: 
42.5 percent assess this minimum at levels 
which are 2-2.5 times the average tax official 
wage in 2003. Very few have indicated that they 
currently have such income. The “scissors” 
between the actual income levels of the tax of-
ficials and their perceptions about the anti-cor-
ruption level of remuneration show that a very 
small portion of the tax administration is not 
vulnerable to corruption pressures. Second, 
it shows that the cost of curbing corruption 
through wage increases might be too high.
Furthermore, the wage-related drivers of 
corruption can hardly be neutralized only 
through increasing pay levels. Tax official 
satisfaction with wages would also depend on 
their perception of the fairness of the wage 
and career system, i.e., how objectively they 
reflect individual performances. This goes 
beyond the perceptions of own necessities 
and pertains to the efficiency and fairness 
of the human resource management, includ-
ing recruitment, performance evaluation and 
training, and position and wage development. 
Rauch and Evans (2000) study recruitment and 
promotion practices in the public service of 35 
developing countries and find a strong positive 
relationship between merit-based recruitment 
and internal promotion on one hand, and the 
efficiency of the bureaucracy on the other 
(including the level of corruption as well). 
Actually, their work failed to establish such a 
relationship between merit-based wages and 
bureaucratic efficiency (corruption).
The uncertain anti-corruption effect of 
adjusting base wages has made tax authori-
ties rely on the non-fixed (targeted award) part 
of the remuneration. If they are well targeted 
and linked with the individual contribution to 
fighting evasion and reducing voluntary com-
pliance costs, bonuses are more flexible and a 
more efficient anti-corruption tool than overall 
wage adjustments. They are superior incen-
tives to wages for at least three reasons. They 
entail less fiscal cost, they do not require setting 
the optimal anti-corruption level of wages, and 
are a better targeted way to reward individual 
achievements. Moreover, they allow channeling 
limited resources to the most important func-
tions and units, such as “Audits,” “Inspections” 
and “Collection.” The reward system, however, 
depends very much on efficiency and account-
ability in these units. It would not yield much 
effect if the selection, assignment, monitoring 
and evaluation of audit and control procedures 
is not modernized and optimized, thus leaving 
opportunities for benefiting selected employees 
or customers. Furthermore, if the reward system 
is not to encourage only enforcement, but also 
voluntary compliance, it may as well need meth-
odology to measure compliance rates and the 
respective contribution of the departments. 24
This paragraph studied the supply-side 
drivers towards taking a bribe. Why a tax of-
ficial may want or need a bribe, however, is 
only one side of the coin. Equally important 
is why he can afford to take a bribe without 
being punished. This pertains to institutional 
restraints and opportunities.
3.2. Restraints
Restraints can be roughly divided into two 
groups: penalties and ethical brakes. As 
already mentioned, the decision of the tax of-
ficial to take a bribe depends on his estimates 
of the probability that the bribery will be pun-
ished and the cost of the punishment. In line 
with these main implications of the crime pre-
vention theory, anti-corruption policies in Bul-
garia have prioritized so far stringent control 
based on the codification of abuses of power 
for personal gain and the respective strict 
penalties. Several amendments to the related 
sections of the penal code since 2002 aligned 
legislation with European standards. Specific 
clauses on tax-related corruption are included 
in the Tax Code, while tax fraud provisions are 
included in the respective tax laws. Adminis-
trative control was also strengthened: external 
and internal public sector audit agencies were 
reformed and strengthened, the tax adminis-
tration internal control unit (“Inspectorate”) 
was reinforced and given more powers, foreign 
consultants were hired to chase delinquent im-
porters beyond customs clearance, and plans 
to establish tax police rose to the top of the tax 
reform agenda. In April, 2004, the tax adminis-
24 The bonus system in Bulgaria, for instance, rewards only tax 
fraud detection, doing little to encourage better services and 
voluntary compliance management, which might be a much 
more feasible anti-corruption strategy in the short run. For 
more detailed assessment see Pashev (2005).
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tration introduced a Code of Ethics. Despite all 
these control and deterrent mechanisms, the 
effective penalties for tax fraud and even more 
so for tax-related corruption are rare. 25
Our tax administration survey tries to meas-
ure the strength of administrative restraints 
by asking respondents about their estimates 
of the cost of bribery. It is high. (13) Neverthe-
less, only 5 percent of the respondents place 
fear of punishment as the leading motive to 
reject a bribe (14). The majority refers to ethical 
brakes (67 percent) or concern for their image 
(22 percent). Given the perceptions about the 
expected penalties, this result implies either 
extremely strong ethical brakes, or low prob-
ability of detection and punishment. 26
The former seems to be a convincing expla-
nation if one considers the reported intolerance 
to corruption. (15). But on the other hand, if 
ethical brakes are so strong, would tax officials 
need such large wage adjustments to neutral-
ize their motivation to take bribes as shown in 
the previous paragraph? Moreover, responses 
related to the difference between bribery and 
gratitude indicate that the ethical borderline 
between professional integrity and abuse of 
power may be fairly elusive for a large part of 
the administration (16). This may explain the 
relative tolerance for free lunches and small 
gifts. This finding weakens the case for ethical 
brakes. It tips the scale towards the conclusion 
that the responses in Table 12 reflect a rather 
weak probability of detection for 67 percent of 
the respondents, or weak probability of proof 
and punishment for 22 percent of them.
The Bulgarian survey also checked em-
ployee perceptions of the role of age and 
years of service on individual inclination to 
take bribes. 27 About 2/3 of all respondents 
deny any relationship whatsoever between 
the age and the length of service with the pro-
pensity to extract bribes, or to yield to corrup-
tion pressures from taxpayers. There seems to 
be a wide consensus on this regardless of age 
and length-of-service of the respondents. This 
result may reflect the effect of opposite factors 
related to age and length of service. On the 
incentive side, income gaps might be felt more 
acutely with age and length of service, while 
bribery technology, “connections” and the 
25 See Coalition 2000 annual reports for account of the detected and penalized corruption acts in Bulgaria at www.anticorruption.bg
26 The survey does not ask directly about employees’ assessment of the probability of detection and their attitude to risk. The 
majority of the respondents, however, define bribery as a direct personal interaction between the briber and the bribee without 
any intermediaries and third parties involved. This implies that detection is difficult, and even more so is proving and punishing 
of bribery.
27 Torgler and Valev (2004) find that the higher the age, the less likely the individuals are to justify corruption.
15. How would you assess the following acts by tax officials? (%)
Acceptable Rather acceptable
Rather 
unacceptable Unacceptable DK/NA
To accept a free lunch/dinner from a taxpayer 4.6 8.4 20.0 65.4 1.6
To accept money to solve a taxpayer’s problem 0.4 1.7 15.2 81.7 1.0
To provide inside information to taxpayers 0.3 0.3 5.0 93.4 1.0
To receive commissions or consultancy 
remunerations for taxpayer services 1.0 3.1 8.6 85.8 1.4
Both parties equally 60.7
Tax offi cials 25.0
Tax payers 8.0
DK/NA 6.3
(b) Who should have a higher punishment? 
(%; single choice)
13. (a) What are the most probable conse-
quences for a tax official who has accepted 
a bribe? (multiple choice)
The tax offi cial will be fi red 60.9
The tax offi cial will depend on the briber in the future 38.1
The offi cial will get some penalty (demoted, transferred 
to another department, be fi ned) 32.5
The detected bribery will be used for pressure against 
him/her. 17.9
The money/gift will be taken 5.2
There will not be any negative consequences 4.6
Other (please specify)... 0.4
Don’t know/No answer 7.3
14. If a taxpayer asks you for a favor in 
return for money or some other form of 
benefit, you would: (% single choice)
Accept it as an act of gratitude 2.4
Accept it because the wages of the tax offi cials are low 2.7
Reject it because of fear of penalty 5.0
Reject it because it is against your ethical standards 66.9
Reject it because it may ruin your reputation 21.6
Other (please specify). 1.3
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ability to survive may improve. Conversely, 
on the deterrent side, the cost of detection 
grows with approaching retirement, as finding 
alternative employment might be much more 
difficult.
Another argument related to the efficiency 
of the ethical brakes asserts that codes of 
ethics can have limited impact if tax officials 
are exposed to corruption outside their work 
environment. Bulgarian tax officials place the 
spread of corruption in society among the 
leading causes of corruption in tax administra-
tion (see Figure 9a above). Accounts of per-
sonal experience indicate that tax officials are 
widely exposed to corruption outside their 
workplace: 35 percent needed to make a bribe 
or other benefit to doctors, and 12.3 percent 
bribed traffic police. In their assessment of 
the current challenges to society, they rank 
corruption 4th, i.e., above such problems as 
poverty, the inefficient health system and the 
judiciary. According to the tax administration, 
the public offices most affected by corruption 
are customs, the judiciary, the public health 
system, the police and the license and permit 
authorities.
Important in the context of the ethical 
restraints is also the opinion of the employees 
about the social damages and costs of corrup-
tion. They seem to be primarily concerned 
with the loss of public credibility and trust 
rather than with economic costs (16).
17. In your opinion, what are the three 
most harmful consequences of tax-related 
corruption?
Erodes public trust in the tax administration 77.3
Discourages compliance 47.9
Leads to fi scal losses 46.4
Creates a shadow economy 37.2
Creates a bad image of the country abroad 16.7
Discourages foreign investors 12.6
Erodes public ethics 12.3
Impedes reforms and development 9.4
Impedes fair competition 4.6
Impedes private entrepreneurship 3.6
DK/NA 1.7
Other 0.4
3.3 Institutional opportunities
The institutional opportunities for corruption 
stem mainly from flaws in tax and account-
ing legislation, and from inefficiencies in the 
organization of work processes. The related 
anticorruption measures pertain to tax policy 
reform. They include, above all, the simplifi-
cation of the tax code through reducing the 
various tax exemptions, which is a preferred 
instrument in many transition countries for 
regulating economic activity. Ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in the accounting standards 
also provide a lot of leeway for discretion and 
corruption pressures during audits.
Furthermore, bribery can be discouraged 
through streamlining the selection, assign-
ment and reporting of audits and inspections, 
as well as through the monitoring and evalua-
tion of their efficiency. It was noted above that 
even though tax officials place flaws in regu-
lations high among the determinants of cor-
ruption, they are less demanding with regard 
to organizational inefficiencies such as poor 
work conditions, shortage of staff, inefficient 
internal controls, flaws in enforcement and 
audit procedures. This finding departs from 
other assessments and should be treated with 
caution. 28
4. “Sizing up” the problem and 
evaluating the policies
Delineating tax corruption from other cor-
ruption practices and studying its underly-
ing drivers and mechanisms would have 
little practical value could it not be used 
28 See, for instance, World Bank (2003).
A bribe implies advance agreement 8.7
If the benefi t is not requested, it is an act of gratitude. 8.3
Depends on the size of the gift:
small gifts are not bribes 49.8
If given for overcoming
bureaucratic obstacles it is gratitude. 12.4
No, there is no difference 16.9
Don’t know/No answer 3.9
A bribe implies advance agreement 8.7
If the benefi t is not requested,
it is rather an act of gratitude. 8.3
16. a) How do you differentiate
between a bribe and gratitude?
(b) Should the maximum level of gratitude 
gifts be regulated, and, if so, at what level?
Yes, up to BGL 10 9.3%
Yes, up to BGL 20 4.0%
Yes, up to BGL 50 5.9%
Yes, other level 0.9%
Yes, level n.a. 1.0%
Not necessary 71.0%
DK/NA 8.0%
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for appraisal of appropriate anti-corruption 
measures and even more importantly for 
monitoring and evaluating their effect. There-
fore, evaluating and measuring corruption 
is central in the context of two interrelated 
policy issues. The first one is the issue of the 
economic and fiscal costs of tax corruption 
in the broader context of ex-ante weighting 
of the costs and benefits of anticorruption 
reforms and measures. This is examined 
below in terms of losses of efficiency, equity 
and revenues. The second one is the issue of 
ex-post monitoring and evaluation of anti-
corruption measures. A set of indicators are 
suggested for the purpose of diagnosing the 
problem and monitoring the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the assigned policy.
4.1. The economic and business 
cost of tax corruption
The fiscal costs of tax corruption are obvi-
ous. As far as it encourages non-compliance, 
it erodes revenues and the capacity of the 
government to perform its regulatory func-
tions and to provide public goods and serv-
ices. 29 Most of these services are crucial for 
investment and growth: business services, 
infrastructure, education and health, etc. In 
transition countries, the perception about this 
causality is usually reversed. Entrepreneurs 
think that because the government does not 
deliver its part of the social contract embod-
ied in the budget, they are free not to comply 
with their part of this contract. One way or an-
other, the fiscal cost of tax corruption is evalu-
ated through the rate of tax evasion and fraud. 
Even if not directly related to bribes, evasion 
is largely motivated by the perceived opportu-
nity for bribery deals in case of detection.
The efficiency costs are not that straight-
forward. There has been some speculation 
in the literature as to the efficiency-enhanc-
ing benefits of administrative corruption. 30 
Some researchers argue that it can decrease 
the bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles to 
investment and growth, so to say to “grease 
the wheels” of growth. Reference has been 
made to some of the economies in Southeast 
Asia which achieved high growth rates despite 
relatively high corruption levels. Applied to 
tax administration, the arguments about cor-
ruption as a lubricant for the bureaucratic ma-
chine might hold in the case of bribes related 
to better taxpayer services. If the latter is well 
institutionalized, it decreases the elements 
of uncertainty. Investors know where and 
how much to pay and exactly how much the 
service will cost in terms of time and money. 
Furthermore, the arguments go, those that 
are most efficient can perhaps offer the high-
est bribes (Beck and Maher 1986; Lien 1986). 
Those that offer bribes to speed up administra-
tive procedures value their time more than the 
rest. Therefore, corruption provides benefits 
in terms of saved time to those for which the 
opportunity cost of time is highest (Lui 1985). 
Even with regard to corruption related to tax 
evasion, it may be speculated that as far as 
it helps reduce effective taxation, it reduces 
tax-driven excess burden, allowing a larger 
share of income to remain within the private 
sector and be used more efficiently for invest-
ment and growth than if it were channeled to 
public expenditures. The more so, as those 
that can afford to offer bribes are likely to be 
the most profitable companies, i.e., the most 
efficient ones. Therefore, tax corruption may 
enhance efficiency as it reduces progress in 
the tax system and the related disincentives to 
investment and growth. There have even been 
arguments about the benefits of using bribes 
for financing of political parties as far as it 
enhances political stability and the capacity of 
the ruling party to pursue its growth policies. 31
29 There have also been arguments, however, that bribes save 
money for public wages, thus allowing a lower tax burden 
which is conducive to growth (Tullock 1996).
30 These arguments were more frequent in the 1960s and 
1970s, but have gradually declined since the 1990s. For a 
comprehensive discussion see Martinez-Vazquez, Azre and 
Boex (2004) Bardhan (1997).
31 Anecdotal evidence from importers and customs officers in 
Bulgaria indicates that in the early years of transition, new 
political elites might not have had a strong enough political 
clientele yet to offer financial support, and might have had 
to rely on institutionalized customs corruption for party 
financing, taking advantage of high import duties and, at 
the time, high sales margins of imports. This may reflect 
inertia from the past as well, when the party used foreign 
trade and state revenues for political financing or the lack 
of strong relationships between the new political elite with 
the business elite (which largely emerged from the old 
political elite), or the limited number of companies that could 
afford to make political investment with dubious returns. It 
may partly explain the perpetual pattern of high customs 
corruption in Bulgaria and other countries in the region. 
With import duties declining, the relative share of VAT fraud 
is growing, which also partly explains the patterns of tax 
evasion in Bulgaria.
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It is not difficult to see the flaws of most 
of these arguments. Corruption can help the 
investor to overcome various bureaucratic 
hurdles, but these hurdles may be the result 
of bribing opportunities. Lacking adequate 
checks and balances, bureaucrats may use 
their power to extort bribes by slowing down 
procedures. Or procedures for non-bribers 
may not be delayed intentionally, but as a 
result of preferential treatment of bribers, who 
jump ahead of the line, often with incomplete 
documents. One way or another, efficiency is 
deteriorated because of corruption opportuni-
ties and practices, while the administration 
has an incentive to push regulations and pro-
cedures towards more complexity and admin-
istrative discretion. There might be gains for 
those paying bribes relative to non-bribing 
competitors, but not relative to what their cost 
would be in a corruption-free environment.
The arguments about the capacity of 
corruption for the purpose of evasion or 
avoidance to reduce direct and dead-weight 
tax burden incurred by the private sector 
touch on one of the core issues in public 
finance, i.e., the optimal size of the govern-
ment. However, in a functioning democracy, 
the choice of what proportion of national 
income to redistribute and the corresponding 
level and structure of revenues is made by the 
public through parliamentary mechanisms. 
Furthermore, a “small government” does not 
just mean a small share of revenues in GDP, 
but an equitable distribution of the benefits 
of the low tax burden to all taxpayers. In most 
transition countries, revenues make up a 
smaller share of the GDP than in the EU, but 
the benefits go primarily to the non-compli-
ant entrepreneurs who are most likely to be 
bribers as well. The idea that the latter may be 
more efficient than non-bribers because they 
can afford to pay more lacks a solid ground, 
as well. Competing through bribery diverts 
resources to rent-seeking, i.e., those that can 
afford to pay bribes are not necessarily the 
most efficient in terms of productivity. On 
the contrary, tax corruption leads to unfair 
competition and a distortion of incentives. 
Competitive and price advantages extracted 
through bribes can hardly channel resources 
to the most productive use and to most com-
petitive companies. Accordingly, resources 
are diverted not towards increased productiv-
ity and efficiency, but towards rent-seeking 
because this is the market test that companies 
need to pass in order to compete. 32 Needless 
to say, price signals driving the efficient alloca-
tion of resources do not work. In sum, cor-
ruption results in a market failure to allocate 
resources efficiently.
Finally, while financing through corrup-
tion might improve political stability and 
efficiency under very special circumstances, 
it is more likely to drive society away from the 
checks and balances of democracy.
These are economic costs; i.e., they affect 
economic efficiency at the aggregate level 
through driving the market away from optimal 
allocation of resources. Tax corruption incurs, 
however, extra business costs at the compa-
ny level, thus discouraging investment. This, 
however, is mainly true in the case of bribes 
for tax services.
Both economic and business costs dis-
courage investment. Bribes for services or to 
overcome excessive compliance costs are a 
direct cost to the company, and are correctly 
referred to as a bribe tax. But economic costs 
may be a stronger disincentive to investment, 
when entrepreneurs can not follow the rules 
of competition through bribes in a corrupt 
environment. This is especially important 
when foreign or domestic investors have the 
choice to invest in a less corrupt economy. 
For these reasons, tax corruption makes the 
investment and competitiveness policies of 
transition countries highly inefficient. Most 
incentives, oriented towards promoting FDI or 
SME growth, or strategic industrial sectors for 
upgrading competitive advantages, are weak-
ened either by rent-seeking opportunities for 
bribers, or by the investment risks they imply 
for non-bribers.
There are also the costs of corruption in 
terms of equity losses. As already mentioned, 
this affects vertical equity through helping 
tax evasion and thus reducing the progress of 
taxation. It also affects horizontal equity by 
allowing bribers to pay less tax than non-brib-
ers. These losses are much more important in 
an emerging market economy where, during 
the first years of transition, the economic 
policy agenda was dominated by redistribu-
32 See Baumol 1990; and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991.
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tion of accumulated national wealth to the 
private sector rather than creating it. The post 
communist societies were sensitive to well-po-
sitioned individuals benefiting from what has 
been perceived as national assets through cor-
rupt privatization or siphoning out the state 
enterprises at the expense of the public at 
large. These equity consequences of corrup-
tion eroded the trust and the support of transi-
tion, and in Bulgaria, for instance, led to de-
lays and backsliding in reforms. Furthermore, 
through its fiscal cost, corruption undermines 
the redistributive capacity of the government 
and thus may lead to more poverty.
The cost of corruption is likely to fall 
more heavily on small taxpayers than on 
large taxpayers. First, small companies face 
heavier compliance costs as a percentage of 
their income, and are far more susceptible to 
corruption pressures from tax officials. Large 
companies have the necessary human, finan-
cial and organizational resources and political 
connections to deal with corrupt tax officials. 
Furthermore, most of them are serviced 
and audited by central large taxpayer units, 
where internal control and corruption preven-
tion are superior relative to the periphery of 
tax administration. Last but not least, small 
companies operate in a far more competitive 
market than large companies and have greater 
difficulties in passing the cost of tax corrup-
tion on to their customers or back to their 
suppliers (Tanzi 1998). This is true especially 
in the cases of subcontracting and outsourcing 
when their clients are large companies.
Last but not least, there are substantial 
indirect economic and business costs of tax 
corruption. Above all, tax corruption is an im-
portant prerequisite for any other corruption 
in two ways. On the one hand, bribes chan-
neled to other administrations seldom come 
from personal balances. They are company 
costs and often come from unregistered re-
tained company income. The opportunity and 
the size of such “bribery” funds is largely a 
function of the level of tax corruption. Moreo-
ver, on the “revenue” side, it is again the tax 
administration that has the strongest anti-cor-
ruption resources at its disposal. It is in a posi-
tion to check the discrepancy between public 
wages and personal wealth and lifestyle of 
corrupt administrative officials, politicians 
and/or legislators. Therefore, the clues to 
limiting corruption in society as a whole are 
very much in the efficiency (i.e., low rate of 
corruption) of tax administration. The greater 
the amount of tax corruption, the larger the 
opportunities for giving and benefiting from 
bribes in all other spheres of the public and 
the private sector will be. In this sense, the 
cost of tax corruption should also be as-
sessed by its spill-over effects on other types 
of corruption - public procurement, licenses 
and permits, public services – and the related 
costs to the economy and business. 33
4.2. Indicators
A direct measurement of corruption is hardly 
reliable. Detected and penalized corrupt activ-
ity are only the tip of the iceberg. Surveys try 
to capture personal experience, but personal 
involvement in bribery, which, in the case of 
taxes often implies more serious violations, 
is quite a sensitive issue to be disclosed in a 
face-to-face interview. Therefore, most meas-
ures of corruption are derived from percep-
tions and assessments of taxpayers with all 
related risk of possible departures from the 
real situation.
Nonetheless, perceptions are important 
for anti-corruption policies. Economic behav-
ior is determined by expected rather than 
actual costs. Thus, investor perceptions of 
corruption levels and related investment risks 
and costs are what matters for the efficient 
allocation of resources. 34 Similarly, it is the 
taxpayers’ evaluation of the net cost of tax 
evasion and bribery and of the cost of compli-
ance that drives corruption rather than the 
actual capacity of the administration to detect 
and punish evasion, or to process applica-
tions. Perceptions, however, might be much 
more instrumental for policy making if they 
are used to diagnose the drivers of corruption 
on the demand and supply side rather than 
the actual level of corruption.
33 See Martinez-Vazquez, Azre and Boex (2004) for a discussion 
of corruption costs in general.
34 On the other hand, it may be argued that the results of 
the monitoring of corruption also create perceptions, with 
the ensuing economic costs, and are thus self fulfilling. 
This is not to be interpreted, however, that an inefficient 
anti-corruption strategy may be substituted by an efficient 
PR strategy with a similar effect on risk assessment and 
investment.
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Annex 2 presents a matrix of indicators for 
evaluating corruption levels and the strength 
of its underlying factors, based on the con-
ceptual framework developed in the previous 
three sections. It builds on the extensive lit-
erature and practical experience of measuring 
and monitoring corruption in transition and 
developing countries as well as on experience 
with the corruption survey of tax administra-
tion in Bulgaria. It does not offer a completed 
framework but rather an open framework that 
can guide diagnostics towards a more bal-
anced approach to benefits and costs. The 
“business cost” approach tends to overesti-
mate the costs on the demand side and may 
fail to explain the persistent patterns of high 
corruption in transition economies. Distin-
guishing between bribes that are imposed 
on business from bribes that are the price 
of a service demanded by business helps in 
better understanding tax corruption. In the 
latter case, bribery is a transaction between 
two beneficiaries at the expense of compliant 
taxpayers. This implies that not all tax corrup-
tion fits well into the beneficiary-victim frame-
work of business cost surveys. More often the 
initiative comes from delinquent taxpayers 
aiming at certain benefits. It also follows that, 
parallel to business surveys, tax administra-
tion surveys are an indispensable part of the 
diagnostics. The suggested indicator matrix 
attempts to incorporate demand and supply 
side incentives and costs into the diagnostics 
framework.
Second, the proposed evaluation frame-
work tries to incorporate hard data. In addi-
tion, like other surveys, it includes reference 
to personal experience as well. Most surveys 
either ask respondents about given or re-
ceived bribes and their size or pose the more 
neutral question of experienced corruption 
pressure. The sensitivity of this issue, stem-
ming from the fact that the taxpayer is more 
often a beneficiary rather than a victim makes 
these results open to questions. 35 Drawing 
on evidence from both sides provides the 
opportunity to overcome the sensitivity of 
asking information on personal involvement 
in wrongdoing by instead asking each party 
about bribery pressure from the other party 
(in addition to the opinion questions of which 
party initiates most deals and why).
Third, the proposed framework tries to go 
beyond the immediate objective of measuring 
corruption per se, but to also assess the in-
tensity of its underlying factors. From a policy 
standpoint, this may have a higher value than 
speculation as to how close the perceived 
level of corruption is to the actual level.
Perceptions about the level of corrup-
tion are usually examined two dimension-
ally: first, in terms of spread and intensity of 
corrupt activity and second, in terms of the 
average value of the corruption deals. The 
penetration rate can be measured through 
assessment of the share of taxpayers and tax 
officials involved in corrupt acts. The intensity 
is measured through the frequency of bribes, 
or, alternatively, through the more neutral 
measure of the frequency of cases of pressure 
towards bribes.
The size of bribes is a central indicator in 
the “business cost” approach to corruption. 
It is measured either in absolute terms or as 
a share of business gross receipts or profits. 36 
These measures can be derived both from 
taxpayers and tax officials’ assessments or 
personal experience. The use of the size of 
bribe as an indicator of corruption levels, 
however, requires certain qualifications in 
the context of the “transaction” approach to 
corruption. In the conventional interpretation 
of the bribe as a business cost, the increase 
of bribes is interpreted as a measure of an ag-
gravated corruption problem. Such an inter-
pretation ignores both the causes and likely 
consequences of the increase of the size of 
bribes. As already mentioned, the growth in 
bribes may reflect the success of anti-cor-
35 The corruption indices of Coalition 2000 in Bulgaria 
incorporate perceptions as well as evidence about 
experienced corruption pressure and personal involvement 
in corruption acts (see the methodology in Nonchev 2004). 
As effective Bulgarian legislation, however, incriminates 
both giving and accepting of bribes and any actions aimed 
at a bribery deal, the evidence about given/offered bribes 
and their size obtained in a face-to-face interview can be 
indicative of changes over time rather than the actual level 
of corruption at a given point in time. International indices 
try to overcome this sensitivity by avoiding questions about 
personal experience, but rather referring to a “typical 
company like yours,” or to “your branch/ sector” (see, for 
instance, the measures of Global Competitiveness Report and 
Transparency International).
36 The absolute measure of the bribe sizes is used by Coalition 
2000, while the second measure is used by the World Bank 
in its Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Surveys (BEEPS) in transition countries. See Gray et al., 
(2004).
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ruption policies. If incentives and brakes on 
the supply side are effective, they increase 
the cost of detection and thus the size of the 
benefit below which the tax official would not 
take the risk of bribery. In brief, the growth 
in the size of bribes may reflect growing risk 
premiums set by the supplier of the bribery 
services. Alternatively, as already mentioned, 
growing bribes may reflect increased penal-
ties for evasion, or increased evasion and 
detection of evasion by the auditors. Depend-
ing on demand and supply elasticities, in 
the best case scenario, growing bribes may 
reduce the spread of corruption, crowding it 
out to the high levels of income and evasion 
(which might facilitate control and detec-
tion), or to other types of bribery with higher 
returns (e.g., public procurement, etc.) In 
this sense higher bribes for evasion may be 
more instrumental than higher penalties in 
deterring it, as the corrupt auditor will have 
more incentives to detect the full amount of 
evasion. This is not to imply that if the admin-
istration cannot minimize evasion bribery 
through penalties, it should rely on the bribe 
costs incurred by business. It rather means 
that the size of the bribes alone is not tell-
ing much about the cost of corruption, if it 
is measured separately from the benefits, 
nor about changes in the level, if it is taken 
separately from the changes in the spread 
of corruption. A more synthetic measure of 
bribes, not as a business cost but as a ratio 
of the received benefit, might provide more 
useful information on the value of the deal 
rather than on the value of the bribe alone.
In addition to the overall level of tax 
corruption measured through the number 
and value of corruption deals, the diagnostic 
framework proposed here underlines the 
importance of the structure of corruption in 
terms of type of bribery services obtained as 
well as in terms of horizontal and vertical pat-
terns of concentration of corruption risks in 
the administration.
In addition to indicators about the inten-
sity and value of deals, the indicator matrix 
proposes indicators of the underlying drivers 
of tax corruption. In line with the conceptual 
framework presented in section two, a dis-
tinction is made between demand side driv-
ers of evasion on one hand, and excessive 
compliance costs on the other. The propen-
sity to evade taxes and, hence, the likelihood 
of related corrupt activity, are assessed in 
terms of indicators of the tax burden and the 
cost of evasion. They are derived both from 
hard data about marginal and effective tax 
rates and compliance gaps, and from in-
volved parties’ assessment of the tax burden 
and the cost of evasion, including the attitude 
of respondents to risk. The cost of evasion is 
perceived to incorporate the probability of 
detection and the expected size of the bribe 
needed to conceal it from authorities. Data 
and feedback on the percentage of success-
fully appealed audits can be indicative about 
the relative weight of regulatory flaws and 
tax inspector pressures in corruption related 
to non-compliance. Therefore, respective 
indicators and assessment are also included 
in the diagnostic framework. The strength of 
the drivers underpinning the second group of 
corruption services, those related to volun-
tary compliance, is diagnosed through vari-
ous measures of the costs of tax compliance, 
as well as the policies of observing standards 
of services and the monitoring, evaluation 
and reporting thereof. Important in this 
regard are the bargaining costs of the bribery 
deals. It depends on the degree of institution-
alization of corruption, i.e., whether entre-
preneurs know who to pay and for what and 
whether they know what exactly they get for 
what they pay and how probable it is that the 
other party will default.
The incentives and opportunities on the 
supply side should be evaluated through the 
tax administration assessment of incentives. 
These pertain mainly to the perceptions of 
the fairness and efficiency of the HR system, 
the core of which is the level of remuneration, 
including the base wage and bonuses. On the 
side of brakes, similar to the demand side, 
what matters most is the evaluation of the 
tax officials on the cost of detection of brib-
ery. This is determined by the probability of 
proving the act, the expected consequences in 
both the case of proved accusation as well as 
of withdrawn accusation, and the attitude to 
risk. In line with the growing evidence in the 
literature on the importance of ethical brakes, 
they are also included in the diagnostics 
framework. The findings can provide guidance 
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on the needs for specialized anti-corruption 
training of tax administrators.
Most importantly, the value of asking tax 
officials about corruption is largely in having 
first hand evidence on the institutional flaws 
that lead to increased opportunities for bribes, 
including those pertaining to flaws in legisla-
tion as well as in the work environment and 
processes.
Conclusion
Tax corruption is traditionally evaluated in 
terms of business cost. While this concept is 
valid in the case of bribes paid by compliant 
tax-payers, or bribes paid by taxpayers whose 
non-compliance is due to flaws in tax and 
accounting regulations, most corruption in 
tax administration seems to be related to tax 
evasion. Drawing evidence from corruption 
surveys of business and tax administration in 
Bulgaria, the study tries to look at tax cor-
ruption from a slightly different perspective. 
It examines the problem and its underlying 
drivers from the viewpoint of transaction 
rather than extra imposed cost on business. 
In the case of detected evasion, the bribe is 
the price paid by business for concealing the 
detected fraud. Other corruption services, like 
those related to speeding up procedures and 
tax returns, may be much more imposed by 
the supplier than demanded by the taxpayer. 
In this sense, the proposed indicator frame-
work identifies the drivers and deterrents, the 
incentives and the institutional opportunities 
that determine the demand and supply of 
corruption services related to compliance and 
enforcement of tax regulations. The proposed 
framework is intended to be a flexible and far 
from comprehensive diagnostic framework for 
evaluating the costs of tax corruption as well 
as formulating and appraising corresponding 
remedies. Moreover, the indicators can be 
used for monitoring and evaluating the impact 
of anti-corruption measures in terms of their 
effect on the level and spread of corruption, 
and more importantly on the underlying driv-
ers. They might be useful as well in comparing 
tax corruption across transition countries, 
which will provide deeper insight into causes 
and remedies.
In a wider context, the policy framework 
developed here might be relevant in better 
distinguishing between business cost and 
benefits when evaluating the institutional 
opportunities for supply or demand of other 
corruption “services.” Interpreting the bribe 
as a net cost for the briber primarily holds 
for corruption related to public services and 
compliance costs (e.g., bribery for speeding 
up permit and licensing procedures). Most 
corrupt activity implies benefits for the briber, 
which are usually ignored when asking the 
bribers about the cost of corruption. These 
include bribes for evasion of taxes, import 
duties and social insurance contributions, but 
also bribes to win public contracts, court trials 
or obtain undue social benefits (as disability 
pensions) where the briber is a net benefici-
ary. This may help to better understand the 
persistence of corruption patterns in transi-
tion economies. Furthermore, the analysis of 
the demand side drivers in these transactions 
may help in the understanding of the changes 
in corruption patterns as driven by differing 
rates of return.
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Annex 1: Tax corruption from a regional perspective
1.1 Transparency International: Corruption in selected transition countries by sector 2004
To what extent do you perceive the following sector in this country/territory to be affected by cor-
ruption? (1: not at all corrupt; 5 extremely corrupt)
Source: Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2004. The shaded parts indicate the 5 most affected 
institutions and sectors in each country, the number is in bold.
1.2 Global Competitiveness Report: Tax corruption in selected transition countries.
In your industry, how common would you estimate that companies make undocumented payments 
or bribes connected with annual tax payments? (1 = common, 7= never occurs)
Global Competitiveness Report (2004, 2003). *80 countries were ranked
in the 2002 – 2003 report and 102 in the 2003 – 2004 report
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Latvia 50 4.8 1.4 54 4.5
Croatia 54 4.7 1.8 45 4.8
Russia 59 4.4 1.9 53 4.6
Serbia 63 4.3 1.6 na  
Romania 70 3.9 2.2 59 4.2
Macedonia 74 3.8 2.3 na  
Ukraine 89 3.4 1.5 72 3.5
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b
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